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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
PUBT.Tc UTILITY VALUATION-GOING-CO NCERN VALUE IN RATE MAKING.-
What is the effect of a city ordinance which proposes to a public utility com-
pany the terms on which it may dispose of its product to the users, but
which is rejected by the company? As to a company not yet doing business
it is clear that the ordinance when rejected becomes a mere legal nullity.
It never was more than an offer that might ripen into a binding contract
by acceptance. That it is by no means a nullity as to a utility actually oper-
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ating in the city after the expiration of its franchise and as a mere tenant
by sufferance of the streets, is held in City and County of Denver v. Denver
Union Water Co. Supreme Court of the U. S. Nos. 294 and 295, decided
March 4, 1918. The city of Denver may well be surprised to learn that by
passing an ordinance which the company rejected it was considerably worse
off than if it had done nothing. In effect, by passing an ordinance fixing
the maximum chaiges permitted to be made by the company "during the
time it shall furthe. act as a water carrier and tenant by sufferance of said
streets", the city gave to the plant a value that made the rates illegal and
defeated the ordinance. That any unaccepted ordinance should have such
an effect is indeed startling, the more so that in this case the city was care-
ful to expressly recite in the preamble that the company had for four years
been without a franchise and a mere tenant by sufferance of the streets and
that this enactment was made without recognizing the right of the company
to occupy the streets or to continue its service.
In Detroit. United Railway v. City of Detroit, 229 U. S., 39, 46, it was
held that a street railroad authorized to operate in the streets of a city for a
definite time, within a reasonable time after the expiration of such term
may be required to remove its tracks and other property from the streets.
This of course would apply equally to the mains and other property of a
water ;ompany after the expiration of its franchise. The city of Denver had
the undoubted legal right upon the expiration of the franchise in i91o, or at
any time thereafter, upon reasonable notice (9o days in the case of the De-
troit United Railway) to require the water company to remove itself and its
property from the streets. In such case the property value would be mere
junk value, and the rates in the ordinance in question would be a much more
favorable option to the company than an order to vacate."
Legally this seems clear, but practically it is very uncertain what are the
rights that may be realized. To require this vacation would ruin the com-
pany. Equally it would ruin the city. It would require the city three years
to install new works, even if not delayed by legal battles and elections. Mean-
time the city must have water. The city is under no legal obligation to
purchase the works even if it has an option to do so. Denver v. New York
Trust Co., 229 U. S. 123, 142. No more is the company under legal obliga-
tion to furnish water. If it does do so it is entitled to a reasonable return
on "fair value of the property being used by it for the public convenience".
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466. But what is the fair value of a plant that
may at any moment be ordered out? Is it junk value? The court holds
that the point is not properly raised by the pleadings, the master's report, the
exceptions, or the assignments of error, but supposing it were properly
raised then by the true intent and meaning of the ordinance (which the com-
pany was fighting and had not in any respect accepted) "new rights were con-
ferred upon the company of such a nature that in considering the effect of the
provisions limiting rates, the plant must be valued not as junk but as prop-
erty useful and in use in the public service." This new right the court con-
strues as "the grant of a new franchise of indefinite duration, terminable
either by the city or by the company at such time and under such circum-
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stances as may be consistent with the duty that both owe to the inhabitants
of Denver". We may agree with the court that to regard the plant as a mere
junk heap is "highly penal and destructive in its effect". This perhaps justifies
basingtrates on the fair value of the plant as in active service. It may be that
if its value is to be.fixed on the cost-of-production-less-depreciatioh theory an
allowance should be made for that uncertain and highly speculative element,
goihg-concern value. See 15 MIcH. L. RXv. 205. But that .his rejected ordi-
nance should have any such effect or any effect seems wi-olly unnatural, and
contrary to every legal principle. The court seems to have caught at this
straw to work out the equitable result of "preserving the substantial rights
of both parties". It is extraordinary that an ordinance held to be ineffectual
for every purpose for which it was passed becomes effectual for the very
purpose for which it expressly states it was not passed. This is indeed a
legal boomerang that injures not the opponent and spends all its force on
the hurler. Possibly the city of Denver deserved the blow:
The explanation probably is this. The position of the public and the
public utility after the expiration of the franchise is a difficult one. The
utility has no further right in the streets, the city has no right to use the
property, Detroit United Railway v. Detroit, 229 U. S. 39. But neither can
let go the other and the courts naturally look for a settlement to work out
substantial justice. This case indicates a strong inclination of the court to
hold that so long as the city continues the use the rate should be based on
the same valuation (with the exception of a possible allowance for fran-
chise value) that would be the base in fixing rates before the expiration of
the franchise. In this division the court catches at this ineffective ordinaizce
as an excuse for avoiding what would otherwise amount to a forfeiture.
Whether the same conclusion will be reached in future cases where no such
excuse exists remains to be seen.
Three justices are unable to agree to such reasoning. Justice Holmes
writing the dissenting opinion admitted that perhaps an instrument could be
framed that granted while it said that it did not. He thought the ordi-
nance meant no more than that the company must accept the city's rates or
;top. As it could be stopped by the city out and oiti, it could be stopped
,unless a certain price was paid. Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436, 443, 444,
,citing Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. However ruinous it might be to both
parties to stop service, the law knows nothing but legal rights, and the rela-
tions of these parties after the expiration of the franchise are independent
of legal rights. Under the circumstances of the case he thought it hard to
see how property could be confiscated by the establishment of almost any
rate, and therefore the ordinances can hardly violate the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment Appleton Water Works Co. v. Railroad. Com., 154
Wis. 121.
The case throws no light on the proper theory of valuation of public
utilities. All parties accepted the cost-of-reproduction-less-depreciation theory
and no issue was made on that. Why going-concern value was fixed at
$ 8oo,ooo instead of $7oo,ooo, or .$I,5ooooo, or more or less, is, as nearly al-
ways happens in such cases, quite unexplained. Appleton Water Works Co.
v. Railroad Coi., 154 Wis. 121, 148, 15 MIcH. L. Rv. 205, 218. E. C. G.
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